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IN THE SUPRP.ME COUR!'
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HELENE SHAW, doing business as

Al\'1'HUR k1IRRAY DANCE

sru.nro,

)

)

)

Plaintiff and Bespondent, )
)

_vs._

)

Case No.

7741

)
ARA M. DIMOim JEPPSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

)

)

Please correct page one ( l) by changing the
word "Plaintiff' s•• to "Defendant • s '' in the third
line ao that the first sentence of the second paragraph will read:

"The facts as set forth in Defendant 1 s brief
consist principallJ of quotations from the contract
between Plaintiff' and Defendant.n
Another Utah case dealing with what constitutes
doing business is MARCHAilT v. NATIONAL :RESERVE l;0Ml?ANI

OF AMERICA, 103 Utah 530, 137 P. 2nd 331 ~ The cast\
holds that, where a forei6l). corporation -takes four
deeds to uteh property and has them. recorded, it is
still not doing business under the statute requiring

a foreign corporation to qualify.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HELENE SHAW, doing business as
ARTHUR :JIURRAY DANCE
STUDIO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 7741

-vs.ARA

~L

DIMOND JEPPSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In accordance with the Appellant's brief the parties
herein will be referred to as Pl~efendant
The facts as set forth in -~- rief consist
principally of quotations from the contract between
Plaintiff and Defendant. It is incomplete and does not
state all the facts necessary to decide the questions
raised. We will therefore make a more complete statement, which facts we believe are substantially undisputed.
Arthur Murray Incorporated is a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in New York
City (Answer of Defendant, Record page 6). Plaintiff
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has a contract with that corporation (Exhibit 2) wherein
she is licensed to use the "Arthur Murray Method" and
the Arthur Murray name in connection with a dancing
school. This license agreement consists of four pages of
fine print. It is impractical to set forth even the substance of the entire contract in this brief but we will
mention such portions as we believe are significant so
far as they lend support to the theory of either Plaintiff
or Defendant.
The Licensee is "Helene Druke Shaw," Plaintiff herein. It recites that Plaintiff "is desirous of personally
conducting a dancing school in Salt Lake City" and of
using the "Arthur Murray Method" and the name of
"Arthur ].{urray." The Licensee is required to register
or file statements "of his use of such name in the proper
office of any county in which such dancing school or
studio or any branch thereof may be located and in any
other governmental office where it is mandatory or
permissive that such a statement be filed ..." (Paragraph 1, Exhibit 2) Licensee agrees to pay 10% of gross
receipts to the Licensor. The license agreement has
many provisions intended to assist the Licensee in maintaining Arthur Murray standards and that require the
Licensee to keep the studio on a basis that is uniform in
quality with Arthur Murray standards. Some of these
requirements are set forth on pages 9-13 of Defendant's
brief. The Defendant's statement as to these requirements is substantially correct with the following qualifications:
In paragraph 4 of the contract referred to on page
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10 of Defendanfs brief, while Licensee agrees to follow
certain standards and policies, the failure to follow them
gives the Licensor only the right to terminate the contract. On page 11 Defendant states that Licensor has
"the right to hire or fire any or all employees of the Salt
Lake studios". This is definitely a misstatement. No
right to hire is contained in said paragraph or anywhere
in the contract. Paragraph 7 does provide that any person hired (by Licensee) and found objectionable "shall
be disruissed forthwith at the request of the Licensor."
Licensor ruay not fire but rnay only request that some
objectionable person shall be disn1issed. Undoubtedly
in any such case the contract would be so construed that
the Licensor could not act arbitrarily. Nevertheless the
only right given Licensor on failure to maintain standards is the right to terminate the agreement. Paragraph
7 specifically says that teachers are to be paid by the
Licensee. There is no evidence that the Licensor ever
did anything pertaining to the dismissal of any employees and in fact it never did. The remaining statements
in Defendant's brief pertaining to the contract so far
as it goes are substantially correct except that she uses
the word "must" where the contract provides "shall."
The Licensee is solely responsible for all expenses
of the dancing school (paragraph 10, Exhibit 2). The
Licensor while requiring the Licensee to live up to certain
requirements and standards has only the· right in case
of such failure on the part of the Licensee to terminate
the agreement on certain notice. (See paragraph 16, 20
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and 22 of Exhibit 2 in addition to paragraph 7 above
mentioned.)
The contract may be analyzed as a license to use the
name and methods of Arthur Murray in the conduct of
a dancing school for which the Licensee pays a 10%
royalty of gross receipts. There is an additional5% paid
to the Licensor which is placed in a trust fund to secure
the performance by the Licensee in the giving of unfinished lessons contracted for at other studios. There
are conditions imposed on the Licensee in the use of
the name and methods of Arthur Murray, breach of which
gives the right to terminate. The net profit in the operation of the studio belongs entirely to the Licensee and
the Licensee is solely responsible for all losses (Record
33). The payment of the 10% of gross receipts to the
Licensor is in no way conditioned upon whether or not
the Licensee makes a profit and the Licensor, therefore,
has no interest in profits or losses, taking a straight
royalty on gross receipts.
Arthur Murray and no representative of Arthur
Murray Inc., has ever visited plaintiff's studio (Record
68-69). Defendant does not contend that the making
of this contract constituted doing business in the State
of Utah by the Licensor, but the contract was necessarily
signed outside of the State of Utah, Arthur Murray who
signs for the corporation never having been within the
State. The following is the undisputed testimony as to
the manner in which the business is conducted.
Plaintiff testified that-"I am the employer." (Record 15) Arthur Murray advises Licensee to have own
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lawyer look at all contracts (Record -!2). Licensee can
purchase instruction books or not as she wishes (Record
-!~). Licensee sends duplicate time slips to New York
along with a weekly report (Record 56). This report
shows only the lessons taught and the gross receipts
(Record 51). It does not show wages paid or expenses
(Record 51 and 67). The facilities at the studio, which
consist of a desk, files, telephone, ballroo1n and phonograph records, are all owned by the Licensee (Record
60 and 67). No representative of Arthur l\1urray, Inc.
has ever visited Salt Lake City (Record 68-69). Plaintiff testified-'· ... :Mr. :iliurray regards us as individual
owners of our studio and anything that comes up, we ar~
not required to do it. We are not part of the corporation of Arthur Murray, et al." (Record 32) Plaintiff
filed "Affidavit of Doing Business Under an Assumed
Name" (Exhibit F'). This exhibit shows that "Helene
Druke Shaw" is the owner and the business is done
"under the name of ARTHUR MURRAY STUDIOS
(not incorporated)". Plaintiff registered the "ARTHUR
MURRAY STl-:-DIO" in the office of the Secretary of
State (Exhibit G). This Exhibit states:
"Helene Druke Shaw, a franchise holder of
the Arthur Murray Studio, registered with this
office the trade name 'Arthur Murray Studio.'"
On October 12, 1949, plaintiff under the name of
"Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, Utah,
hereinafter referred to as the 'Employer' " entered into
a contract with the defendant (who was then Ara M.
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Dimond and who later became Mrs. Jeppson) (Exhibit
A). Paragraphs 5 to 11 of this agreement are set forth
in plaintiff's brief at pages 4 to 7. The contract shows
distinctly that Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake
City is separate and distinct from Arthur Murray, Inc.
It recites that-"The employer conducts an Arthur Murray dancing school." It then refers to "Arthur Murray,
Inc." and its predecessors, which have expended and
will continue to expend large sums of money to develop
methods of teaching and dancing. The contract thus
clearly distinguishes between the employer and Arthur
Murray, Inc.
In paragraph 6 of the agreement Arthur Murray,
Inc. is further distinguished from the employer by the
statement that-"The employer may photograph the
employee, and the employer and Arthur Murray, Inc.
may forever use his or her name ... ",etc. The contract is
signed "Arthur l\iurray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City,
Utah, by Helene Druke Shaw, Employer."
We thus see that the defendant was not misled as
to whether she was employed by Helene Druke Shaw
doing business as Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt
Lake City, Utah, or by Arthur Murray, Inc., a New York
corporation. She claims no misrepresentation to her as
to who was her employer and relies on nothing but the
form of the license agreement in her claim that Arthur
Murray, Inc. was in fact her employer and is in fact the
plaintiff in this case.
Since defendant relies solely on the defense that
the plaintiff is in fact Arthur Murray, Inc., a foreign cor-
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poration doing business in Salt Lake City, other evidence
is perhaps not now particularly n1aterial. Nevertheless,
a brief statement of other facts is helpful in giving a
more complete picture of this case. Plaintiff testified
that teachers such as the defendant are given a full
training course of three to four months of four hours per
day prior to the tin1e the employee commences teaching.
One hour a day of instruction is continued thereafter
(Record 16). Plaintiff attends conventions of the Arthur
:Murray system periodically in order to keep up on the
latest methods and dances. These conventions may be
in any city of the United States (Record 16). These
trips are all at the cost of the plaintiff (Record 17).
Plaintiff has ten or twelve manuals published by Arthur
Murray which cost from $25 to $200 each, one such
manual costing $400 (Record 18). All the material in
these books and the knowledge acquired by plaintiff by
fifteen years' experience is given the teachers (Record
19). This experience includes methods of approach and
teaching as well as actual dance training (Record 20).
Defendant after being so employed quit after approximately one and a half years' employme~t without
stating any reason (Record 20). It will be noted that the
contract restricts the defendant from teaching dancing
only for a period of two years and within a twenty-five
mile radius of the Arthur Murray Dancing Studio. No
claim is made that the restriction is not a reasonable
and lawful one and necessary to protect the good will
of plaintiff's business. It is undisputed that defendant
was trained as a dancing teacher entirely by plaintiff;
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that she has had access to all of the records and files
of plaintiff showing names, telephone numbers and addresses of all students; that plaintiff has spent large
sums of money to secure these students and train defendant. Defendant if permitted to break the contract
could advertise as an Arthur Murray teacher, contact
all students fonnerly with plaintiff and give them lessons at a much cheaper rate than plaintiff (Record 21
and 26). It was shown that prior to the institution of
the Arthur Murray method there was only instruction
on a commercial basis of the waltz and fox trot; that
Arthur Murray has spent a great deal of money in research to develop South American dances, and that now
one hundred twenty steps are taught; that this is unique
in the history of dancing in the United States (Record
23). Plaintiff, therefore, has a great deal of good will
to protect in the enforcement of this contract.
The trial court entered a decree enjoining defendant from teaching dancing, etc., as provided in the contract.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. This suit is by plaintiff in her own name and
in her own right on a contract made exclusively between
plaintiff and defendant.

2. Arthur Murray, Inc., a foreign corporation, is
not a party to this action and, therefore, no question
arises with regard to the right of a foreign corporation
to sue in the State of Utah.
3. Assuming (without admitting) that doing aH of
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the things provided for 1n the license agreement by
Arthur :Murray, Inc., a foreign corporation, would constitute doing business in the State of Utah, the 1nere
provision for such activity is insufficient to constitute
doing business, and the question must be determined by
what has actually been done by the foreign corporation.
4. There is nothing to support the claim that
Arthur Murray, Inc. is doing business in the State of
Utah.
ARGUMENT
1. THIS SUIT IS BY PLAINTIFF IN HER OWN NAME
AND IN HER OWN RIGHT ON A CONTRACT MADE EXCLUSIVELY BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.

The action herein involved is based solely on a written contract (Exhibit 1). The question of whether or not
plaintiff sues in her own right or sues to enforce this
contract in the right of Arthur Murray, Inc. should be
determined by the provisions of the agreement. There
is no contention that there is any matter agreed to between the plaintiff and defendant except as contained
in the written contract. As pointed out in the statement
of facts, the "employer" is "Arthur Murray Dance Studio
of Salt Lake City, Utah." Arthur Murray, Inc. is expressly referred to in the contract as a third party and
not as a party to the contract. All of the things to be
done by the defendant are to be done for the employer,
Arthur Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, Utah.
Everything which is to be done as consideration for
the promises of the defendant is to be done by the Arthur
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Murray Dance Studio of Salt Lake City, Utah. Such
e1nployer is responsible for the payment for the services
rendered. In each instance it is the "employer" who
obligates herself to the employee. Is it possible under
this contract that the defendant could sue Arthur 1\furray, Inc. in the event of the failure of the employer to
pay her wages~ Certainly not. Arthur Murray, Inc. in
no way enters into the contract as the principal. In
whatever way Arthur Murray, Inc. may be a third party
beneficiary, it is not as a party to this contract, either as
disclosed or undisclosed principal. The fundamental
relationship of any agency between Arthur Murray, Inc.
and the plaintiff is missing in this contract and in this
action.
In Volume 1, page 7, of the "Restatement of the
Law of Agency" it is stated:
"(1) Agency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his
behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken
is the principaL
(3) The one who is to act is the agent."

Agency is again defined in 2 Am. J ur. 13, Section
2, as follows:
"An agency may be defined as a contract
either express or implied upon a consideration,
or a gratuitous undertaking, by which one of the
parties confides to the other the management vf
some business to be transacted in his name or
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on his account, and by which that other assumes
to do the business and render an account of it.
This is con1parable with the definition of agency
as adopted by the American Law Institute."
The case of PFRKELL Ys. CITY OF FLORENCE,
175 SO. 417 giYes the following staten1ent defining
agency:

.. r nder the rules, as laid down by all of the
authorities, the distinguishing features of agency
are its representative character and its derivative
authority. \Yhether a particular relationship is
an agency depends on the relations of the parties
as they in fact exist, without regard to what they
call their relationship. (citing cases) Before there
can be an agent, there must be a principal, and,
'lrhen a person acts independently, he cannot be
classed as an agent for any purpose."
Agency is further defined in the case of COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY CLUB vs. HIGGINS, 23 F·ED. SUPP.
572 at page 574 as follows :
"While innumerable definitions and interpretations of the term 'agency' may be found in the
law reports and law digests, I think that the
statement found in the case of S.. B. McMaster,
Inc., v. Chevrolet Motor Co., D. C., 3 F. 2d 469,
474, is sufficiently clear to merit quotation. It is
there stated in part: 'Without undertaking to
review in detail all the various definitions that
have been made of the term, I think it may be
safely asserted that they all recognize two distinctly essential elements. The first is that the
agent is a representative and acts, not for himSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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self, but for another. The second is that his acts
within the scope of his authority must be binding
upon his principal.' "
The contract between plaintiff and defendant is
simply one of employment of the defendant by the plaintiff. There is no possibility from any facts in this case
which would make it possible for the plaintiff to have
hired the defendant as an employee of Arthur Murray,
Inc. Even if it were possible, it was not in fact done,
the contract being unrelated to Arthur M:urray, Inc.
No question of a foreign corporation doing business in
the State of Utah is presented.
2. ARTHUR MURRAY, INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, IS NOT A PARTY TO THIS ACTION AND, THEREFORE, NO QUESTION ARISES WITH REGARD TO THE
RIGHT OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO SUE IN THE
STATE OF UTAH.

This point is closely related to the first. Arthur
Murray, Inc. of New York is seeking nothing, has not
come into Court, and defendant has no reason to claim
that it is a party in any way. Arthur Murray, Inc.,
either directly or indirectly, is asking nothing from
this or the trial court. What has been said with regard
to point No. 1 and the authorities in support thereof
sustain point No. 2.
3. ASSUMING (WITHOUT ADMITTING) THAT DOING
ALL OF THE THINGS PROVIDED FOR IN THE LICENSE
AGREEMENT BY ARTHUR MURRAY, INC., A FOREIGN
CORPORATION, WOULD CONSTITUTE DOING BUSINESS
IN THE STATE OF UTAH, THE MERE PROVISION FOR
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SUCH ACTIVITY IS INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
DOING BUSINESS, AND THE QUESTION MUST BE DETERMINED BY WHAT HAS ACTUALLY BEEN DONE BY
THE FOREIGN CORPORATION.

The only possible support which defendant has for
her contention that Arthur :Murray, Inc. is doing business in the State of Utah is the license agreement between such corporation and the plaintiff (Exhibit 2).
Assuming for the moment that if Arthur :Murray, Inc.
exercised its prerogatives that it would then be doing
business in the State of Utah, it does not follow that
it is doing business simply because it entered into the
license agreement. It has never had any representative
in the State of Utah. At least until it does some of
the things provided for in the contract (which defendant claims would be doing business), no business is
transacted within the State. This is supported by the
case of UNITED STATES vs. AMERICAN BELL
TELEPHONE CO~fP ANY AND OTHERS, 29 FED.
17. The question in that case was whether or not a
certain license agreement between a foreign corporation
and a local telephone company constituted doing business. There were provisions similar to the license agreement in question. The Court held that it did not create
the relationship of agency. The Court then further held
that whether or not the foreign corporation is carrying
on business in the State must be determined by what
it has done or is doing and not the powers reserved
in existing contracts, which powers have not yet been
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exercised. The Court's holding is well stated in Syllabus
9 as follows :
"Whether a foreign corporation is carrying
on business in a state must be determined by
what it has done, or is doing, rather than by
what it may hereafter do, under powers reserved
to it in existing contracts, but not yet exercised.
For one person to supply the means to another
to do business with or on is not the doing of
that business by the former."
This case is approved and the ruling clearly stated
1n LAVARRE vs. INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY, 37 FED. 2d 141 at page 146. The Court said:
"The facts in the case above cited with
approval by the Supreme Court are illustrative
of the strictness with which that court regards
service of process upon corporate defendants.
The action there was against the American Bell
Telephone Company, a Massachusetts corporation, and was brought in Ohio. Service was had
upon the Cleveland Telephone Company, in which
the Bell Company owned stock, and it was alleged
to be an operating agency of the Bell Company
in Ohio. The facts alleged in regard to the intercorporate relation are stated by the court in an
analysis of the bill of complaint. In a long and
well-considered opinion, Judge Jackson held that
such facts were not sufficient to make the Bell
Company present and doing business in Ohio
because of its relation with the local corporation.
In conclusion the court said (29 F. page 46):
'The various matters relied on to show that the
American Bell Telephone Company is to be found
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in Ohio, and subject to the jurisdiction of this
court,- such as its ownership of the telephone
instruments used by the licensee corporations;
the ownership of stock in one or more of the local
companies; the rights and powers reserved to it
of resuming possession of its telephone instruments, and taking control of the telephone business, in the event of default on the· part of the
licensee corporations in complying with the provisions of the license contracts; the sharing in
the gross receipts of certain portions of the
business done; the reservation of rents and royalties; the right to make changes ; and the restrictions and limitations imposed upon the licensee
companies, -neither singly nor in the aggregate
establish the two essential facts necessary to
bring the American Bell Telephone Company
within the power and jurisdiction of this court,
viz., that said corporation is now, or was at the
commencement of this suit, carrying on its business in the State of Ohio, and that it had a
"managing agent" or agents representing it
here.'"
4. THERE IS NOTHING TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM
THAT ARTHUR MURRAY, INC. IS DOING BUSINESS IN
THE STATE OF UTAH.

The previous three points and authorities cited
should, we think, clearly dispose of this case. However, there are cases in which admittedly the foreign
corporation was involved as a party in the litigation
but, under license agreements similar to the one involved
herein, it was held that the foreign corporation was not
doing business within statutes requiring foreign corporations to qualify.
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A leading case on this subject is 1fcMASTER vs.
CHEVROLET MOTOR COMPANY, 3 FED. 2d 469.
The question in this case was whether service of process
on a "dealer" was good service on defendant, a foreign
corporation. The question presented is stated as follows:
"I will now consider the defendant's motion
to set aside the service and dismiss the case.
While the motion is based both upon the ground
that the defendant is not doing business in the
state and that the person upon whom service
was made is not defendant's agent, nevertheless
the two grounds may be considered together, for
under the facts in the case, if the defendant is
doing business at all in this state, it is by virtue
of the agency created by the contract referred
to, and if, per contra, the contract does not create the relation of agency, the defendant is not
doing business in the state. In other words, there
is no proof or claim before this court that the
defendant is doing business in the state save
through the acts of the Barrow-Chevrolet Company, under the terms of the contract between
that company and the defendant. It is true that
the plaintiff does claim that when the defendant
exercises the right under the contract to come
into the state and inspect the Barrow-Chevrolet's
place of business, records, accounts, etc., such
acts themselves constitute doing business in the
state. But I do not think that such acts alone
would constitute doing business in the state in
the sense that the defendant would be liable to
process in such state. Therefore, as I view it, a
decision upon the question of agency will dispose
of both grounds of the motion." (Page 471)
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The Court held that the agreement did not create
an agency so as to constitute the Chevrolet Motor Company doing business in the state. The ruling of the
court and the essential facts are contained in the following state1nent:
"Without undertaking to review in detail all
the various definitions that have been made of
the term, I think it may safely be asserted that
they all recognize two distinctly essential eleInents. The first is that the agent is a representative and acts, not for himself, but for another.
The second is that his acts within the scope of
his authority must be binding upon his principal.
In the contract in question one may search in
vain for anything showing that whatever the
person termed the 'dealer' is to do under the
contract, he is acting for the person termed the
'seller'. All of the acts of the dealer are for his
own account. His purchases are made for himself. His maintenance of an office, station, service rendered, sales of cars, advertising, and all
of the other various features in the contract
upon which plaintiff relies as establishing an
agency, are acts which the dealer performs, not
as the act of the seller nor for the seller, but
as his own act and for himself. We may also
search in vain in the contract for any authority
whatever for the dealer to bind the seller. Whatever may be required of that contract of the
dealer, whatever he does under that contract,
the liability and responsibility are his, so far as
other persons are concerned, and not the liability
or responsibility of the seller. To make assurance doubly sure, the parties have expressly
declared that he shall have no such authority.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
It is clear to my mind that no third party could
hold the seller liable for any act of the dealer
performed under that contract." (Page 474)
In the case of STATE vs. FORD :MOTOR COJ\1PANY, 38 S.E. 242, the State of Carolina attempted to
require the defendant to comply with the State law
relating to foreign corporations which were doing business in the State. The Supreme Court of South Carolina had previously held that the defendant, Ford Motor
Company, could be served with process in the State
when the summons was served on C. E. McCallister, an
employee of the defendant while "servicing its dealers".
It had not held that the "dealer" or any of its employees could be served with process as agents for the defendant. The Court made a distinction between doing
business in the State for the service of process on an
actual employee in the State on business of the foreign
corporation and doing business within the statute requiring that the foreign corporation file its articles and
pay fees and expenses. This case held that the Ford
Motor Company was not doing business in the State
for such purpose. The State in its claim relied upon
the contract between the defendant and local dealers.
For the form of the dealer's contract the Court referred
to and incorporated the case of THOMPSON vs. FORD
MOTOR COMPANY, 21 S.E. 34 (see second column page
244 of 38 S.E. 2d). The dealer's contract is analyzed
at pages 37 to 39 of 21 S.E. We quote a portion of that
opinion. The Court said:
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"It is provided that 'title to aH Company
products, except in a case where the invoice
shows sale to be on credit, shall be and remain
with Company until actual receipt of the full
purchase price in cash by Company.' With reference to checks and other negotiable paper from
the dealer, the agreement provides: 'Until Company has received cash in full payment of any
such check, draft or other commercial paper, its
right to retake and resell Company products
for which such paper is issued shall continue.'
It is provided that the prices of all Company
products shall be subject to change from time
to time, that the dealer agrees to maintain a
place of business 'and only one place of business'
(subject to one or two exceptions) and that such
place of business shall be 'located in a place and
equipped in a manner acceptable to Company;
to display conspicuously thereon approved F·ord
signs; to install and maintain therein the tools,
machinery and equipment recommended by Company; to employ sufficient, competent salesmen
to solicit adequately all potential purchasers of
Company products in the community in which
Dealer is located, and sufficient service mechanics
to render prompt, efficient service to owners of
Company products and to render such service to
any owners of Company products engaging such
service.' It further provides that the dealer is
'to install and maintain an accounting system
in accordance with Ford Dealers Accounting Procedure Manual as approved by Company; to furnish Company at regular intervals as designated
by Company accurate financial statements reflecting the true financial condition of dealer's business on standard forms provided by Company
for that purpose; to allow representatives of
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Company, at all reasonable times and from time
to time, to examine all records, contracts and
accounts covering sales or service of Company
products by Dealer and to examine Dealer's
stock and place of business and to test Dealer's
equipment and facilities' and 'to submit promptly
to Company, Dealer's Ten Day Reports accurately and fully prepared on forms provided by
Company therefor and on the dates specified
therein.
*

*

*

*

*

*

"Then follow certain restrictions upon the
dealer with reference to sales made beyond his
territory. In certain instances the Company acts
as umpire between dealers, but does not guarantee the results. Then follow certain restrictions as to the sale of parts for Ford automobiles
and trucks, except 'genuine Ford' parts. The
dealer agrees not to use sales policies or advertising matter in any manner in connection with
his business as a Ford Dealer which are detrimental to the Company or to other F·ord dealers,
or to which the Company may object as being
detrimental to its good will.
*

*

*

*

*

*

"The contract contains many other provisions
retaining and strengthening the vast control
which respondent had the right to exercise over
the conduct and affairs of D. W. Gavin & Co.,
Inc., but enough examples have been given herein
to illustrate the authority which respondent exercised over this 'dealer'."
On these facts the Court held that the Ford Motor
Company was not doing intrastate business within the
statute requiring such foreign corporations to qualify.
The Court said :
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"Appellant's business in South Carolina is
interstate in character, according to the evidence,
and it cannot be required to domesticate or suffer
the statutory penalty for failure thereabout. Infliction of the latter would burden interstate comn1erce, which the state cannot constitutionally
do. Appellant's many dealers in the state are
not its agents; they are in intrastate business
here, not it. And its traveling representatives
are here on occasions 'servicing' its warranties,
cultivating the interstate business, supervising
it and soliciting more, but they make no local
sales or collections nor engage otherwise in intrastate business so far as the record before us
shows. The activities of the itinerant representatives are incidental to the interstate business but
they undoubtedly manifest the presence here of
the corporation for jurisdictional purposes." (38
S.E. 254)
See also the cases of STREET AND SMITH PUBLICATIONS vs. SPIKES, 120 FED. 2d 895; WATSON
FIREPROOF WINDOW COMPANY vs. E. A. RYSDON, 189 ILL. APP. 134 (affirmed 190 Ill. App. 316);
PAULINE OIL AND GAS COMPANY vs. MUTUAL
TANK LINE (OKLA. 1926), 246 PAC. 851.
Defendant at the trial placed much emphasis on the
fact that plaintiff advertised in the telephone directory
and listed herself as "Helene Druke, Director" of Arthur
:Murray Studios. This has no significance whatever so
far as we can see but it has been held that even though
Arthur :Murray, Inc. had listed its name in the directory
it is not evidence of doing business. See the case of
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GABRIEL GARLEN vs. BANCAMERICA-BLAIR
CORPORATION, 205 MINN. 275, 285 N.W. 723.
Perhaps there has been no previous Utah case with
facts particularly similar to this case. We call attention,
however, to the case of BROWNING vs. STATE TAX
COMMISSION, 107 UTAH 457, 154 PACIFIC 2d 993.
The question in this case was what portion of the Browning Company business should be allocated to the State
of Utah for franchise tax purposes. The question was
what was the "business done" within the State. It was
claimed by the corporation that rentals collected from
property outside of the State of Utah was not business
done within the State. The test applied by the Court
was whether or not the collection of the rent on property
in another state would constitute doing business in that
state. If not, then it was business done in the State of
Utah where the main office was located. As to this
test the Court said:
"Where a corporation is conducting an investment business in Utah and also in other
states, the income derived from its entire investment business must be allocated in the manner
prescribed by subsections (1) and (3) of Section
80-13-21. Rents, interest and dividends derived
from 'business done' by the taxpayer without the
State of Utah should not be allocated to Utah.
Rents, interest and dividends derived from 'business done' by the taxpayer within the State of
Utah. should be allocated to Utah." (Page 464)
The Court held that the collection of rent on prop-
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erty in another State was not doing business in that
State and it was, therefore, business done in Utah where
the home office was located. The Court said:
.. If upon certain conduct it would be held
that a corporation was doing business in Utah
so as to subject it to the corporate franchise tax,
the same conduct in another state would constitute doing business in said other state and income
derived therefrom would not be allocated to Utah.
The test as to whether a corporation is doing
business in states other than Utah under particular fact situations would therefore be: Would
such conduct if carried on in Utah be held to
constitute doing business so as to subject the
corporation to the Utah corporate franchise tax."
This Utah court held that the business done was in
Utah. Arthur Murray, Inc. has its office in New York.
Certainly the collection of royalties from a gross income
of a business in Utah is no more doing business than
the owning, managing and collecting of rent on property
in another state.
ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT'S CASES
INTERNATIONAL TEXT BOOK COMPANY vs.
PIGG, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. ed. 678. Plaintiff, a corporation of Pennsylvania, was selling correspondence school
courses in Kansas. Sale was made through an agent.
(The agency was not disputed.) The agent had an office
in Kansa~. worked on a salary plus commission, signed
contracts with the purchasers, accepted a partial pay-
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ment and forwarded the contract and the money to the
office of the plaintiff in Pennsylvania. The pertinent
facts are set forth in the following part of the opinion:
"During the period covered by the present
transaction, the company had a solicitor-collector
for the territory that included Topeka, Kansas,
and he solicited students to take correspondence
courses in the plaintiff's schools. His office in
Kansas was procured and maintained at his own
expense, for the purpose of furthering the procuring of applications for scholarships and the
collection of fees therefor. The company had no
office of its own in that state. The solicitor-collector was paid a fixed salary by the company
and a commission on the number of applications
obtained and the collections made. He sent daily
reports to the company for his territory, those
reports showing that for March, 1906, the aggregate collections on scholarships and deferred
payments on subscriptions approached $500.
"At the date of the agreement sued on, and
and at the time this suit was brought, numerous
persons in Topeka were taking the plaintiff's
course of instruction by correspondence through
the mails. The contracts for those courses were
procured by its solicitor-collector assigned to
duty in Kansas, and, as stated, payments thereon
were collected and remitted by him to the plaintiff at Scranton." (Pages 682-683)
Even on these facts the case is only dictum so far
as doing business in the State is concerned as the plaintiff was permitted to recover because of the unconstitutionality of the statute. However, we do not question
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the reasoning of the Supre1ne Court. The plaintiff was
admittedly represented by an agent who Inade contracts
in the State of Kansas in the name of and for the benefit
of the foreign corporation. :Money was collected on the
contracts, which undoubtedly constituted doing business. There is no similarity upon the facts with the
case before the Court.
FOX vs. L~\ VENDER, 89 UTAH 115, 56 PAC.
~d 1049. The question in this case was whether the
driver of a car was the agent of defendant. In determining that question the Court said there were the following pertinent facts:
"The five ingredients of the problem before
us to be taken into consideration to determine
whether the wife had control of the husband
(as driver of the car) during the trip to Bingham
are: (1) The relationship of husband and wife;
( 2) the fact that they were on an errand to get
a dress for the wife; (3) the joint ownership of
the car; (4) the fact that the wife and husband
agreed that the husband should drive; and (5)
four occupants of the car were on a trip to call
on the mother." (Pages 119-120)
There is nothing in this case at all helpful on the
question of agency.
GOLDEN vs. AMERICAN KEENE CEMENT
CO:JIP ANY, 98 UTAH 23, 95 PAC. 2d 755. Property
consisting of a cement and plaster mill owned by the
defendant, American Keene Cement and Plaster Company, had been legally owned by John Bowditch, Jr.,
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who at the time of taking title in his name was Yice
President and General Manager of California Stucco
Products Company, a foreign corporation not qualified
to do business in Utah. During such ownership by John
Bowditch, Jr. the property was operated under the name
of National Keene Cement Company, which was unincorporated and which we may assume was a trade name
for the true owner. Later when Bowditch left the employment of the California Stucco Company the property
was at that time conveyed to Thomas W. Golden, plaintiff herein, who was an employee of California Stucco
Products Company. While legal title was in the name
of Golden, a contract of sale was made by and in the
name of California Stucco Products Company to the
predecessor of defendant, Edward E. Jones Investment
Company. It was recited in this contract that the California Stucco Products Company had an interest in the
property. The sale provided for a note and mortgage
which was later given by the defendant, American Keene
Cement and Plaster Company, at the time transfer was
made to it. Payments on this note and mortgage had
been made to the California Stucco Products Company.
On attempted foreclosure by Golden, in whose name
the note and mortgage had been given, defendant claimed that California Stucco Products Company was the
real owner and plaintiff and that it was not entitled to
sue, being a foreign corporation having done business
in the State and not qualified in accordance with our
statute. The trial court had held for the plaintiff on
this point. Certain evidence had been excluded. In
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reversing the case for a new trial the Supreme Court
suggested that there was strong evidence that Golden
was really acting for and on behalf of the California
Stucco Products Company. The Supreme Court said:
··As a matter of fact, it is rather hard to
believe that Golden was other than an alter ego
of the California Corporation. It is true that
the evidence offered to prove that he was an employee of the corporation was properly ruled out,
but when one considers how his name first came
into the picture through the agreement; how all
the transactions were carried through by officers
and directors of the California Corporation; the
significance of changes in title to the property
as the personnel of the corporation changes, and
as companies change; that interest payments
were made to that corporation; and how Golden
has been so conspicuously absent, even to the
extent of failing to appear in the case by deposition attacking any of this evidence-when one
considers these facts, there is more than a suspicion in one's mind that all is not as it should
be." (Page 32)
There was nothing in the case to show that Golden
personally had any beneficial interest in the property
or the business conducted or in the note and mortgage
that was sued on in his name; whereas, in the case
before this Court the plaintiff has full beneficial interest
as well as legal title to all property involved including
furniture, fixtures, lease, accounts receivable and the
contract herein sued upon. Arthur l\Iurray, Inc. has only
a contractual right to 10% of the gross income with
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a right to terminate upon failure to pay or to comply
with other conditions.
Another question in the Golden case was whether at
the time the property was opera ted under the National
Keene Cement Company name the business was not in
fact carried on by or for the benefit of California Stucco
Products Company. Letters had been offered in evidence
showing that the California Stucco Products Company
included in its income tax return the result of the business of National Keene Cement Company. Payments on
the mortgage had in fact been made to California Stucco
Products Company; the sale of the property had been
in its name, the contract reciting that it had an interest.
These and other facts which might appear in the new
trial were suggested by the Supreme Court as evidence
that the California Stucco Products Company was in
fact doing business in the State. The Supreme Court,
however, made no final conclusion. It suggested that
one of the chief questions was who was interested as
owner of the National Keene Cement Company. We
submit that the facts of this case have no similarity to
the case before this court.
FRANKLIN BUILDING AND LOAN COMPANY
vs. PEPPARD, 97 UTAH 483, 93 PAC. 2d 925. We do
not dispute the holding of this case as stated by the
defendant at page 18 of her brief that a foreign corporation actually doing business in the State cannot
foreclose a mortgage unless qualified as a foreign corporation. The same may be said of the cases of DUNN
vs. UTAH SERUM COMPANY, 65 UTAH 527, 238
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PAC. 245, and FIRST NATIONAL BANK vs. PARKER, 57 UTAH 290, 194 PAC. 661, these cases being
cited on page 19 of plaintiff's brief.
CONCLUSION
\Ve submit that there is no evidence that Arthur
~Iurray, Inc., a foreign corporation, is or has been doing
business in the State of Utah. The signing of the license
agreement did not constitute doing business because
this would be insufficient under the adjudicated cases,
and it was not signed in the State of Utah. Arthur
.Murray, Inc. has never exercised any of its prerogatives
under the license agreement, which are at most only
conditions under which the plaintiff can continue the
use of the name and methods of Arthur Murray. It is
clear from the evidence and facts in this case that plaintiff made a contract in her own right; that Arthur
Murray, Inc. was not a party to the contract and that
this suit is solely in the name of and for the benefit of
the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
CHENEY, MARR, WILKINS &
CANNON and ROBERT M.
YEATES,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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